The rise of co-arranged lending

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초록

This paper documents an increase in co-arranged loans in private loan markets, where multiple lead arrangers jointly participate in a loan contract. We show that lenders co-arrange loans for high-quality borrowers (large, highly profitable, and with strong credit ratings), indicating a strategic response to increased credit market competition. Using the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act as a natural experiment, we find that the regulatory change, which encouraged lending competition by allowing greater involvement from nonbank institutions, significantly increases the likelihood of co-arrange loan issuance. We also find that co-arranged loans carry higher interest rates. Overall, our findings suggest that credit market competition shapes debt ownership structures and raises financing costs for borrowers.

키워드

Co-arrangement; Multiple lead arrangers; Loan contracts; Credit market competition; G21; G23; L14; LOAN SYNDICATION; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; CHOICE; MARKET; IMPACT; SALES; BANKS
제목
The rise of co-arranged lending
저자
Choi, Changhwan; Chung, Chune Young
DOI
10.1186/s40854-026-00967-0
발행일
2026-09
유형
Article
저널명
Financial Innovation
권
12
호
1