전문경영자 기업의 지배구조와 비대칭적 원가행태

초록

This study aims to investigate empirically that corporate governance structures, such as board, audit and ownership, can mitigate sticky cost behavior induced by agency problem in employed manager’s firms. The empirical results are as follows. First, cost stickiness have strengthened as the ratio of outside directors to board members have increased. Wheres, cost stickiness has been weakened by the role of expertise of outside directors. It implies that the expertise rather than the number of outsider directors might play a role in restraining agency problem. Second, in the perspective of audit structure, auditor industry specialization has weaken cost stickiness significantly while the constitution of audit committee itself is not definite association with sticky cost behavior. Third, the shares of large shareholders have weakened the stickiness of all cost items definitely, unlike the effect of foreign investors on only selling cost items. The contribution of this study is that it suggests an empirical evidence for the control role of extensive corporate governance structure on sticky cost behavior stemming from agency problem, focusing employed manager’s firms to approach intrinsic problem between principal and agent directly.

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