전문경영자 기업의 소유 및 이사회 구조가 보수주의에 미치는 영향

초록

Separation between ownership and management might induce agency problem for management to maximizing its own utility instead of sacrificing shareholder’s interest. Previous studies have investigated that low level of conservative accounting is related to agency costs. Meanwhile, various corporate governance structures have developed to mitigate agency costs which are caused by conflict of interests between shareholders and managements. This study aims to investigate whether agent-inspecting corporate governance such as ownership and board structure intensify conservative accounting by controlling agency problem. The empirical results are as follows. First, conservative accounting is weaker in case of firms by employed manager than in those by owner manger. Second, large shareholder ownership causes strong conservatism by mitigating agency problem. Third, conservative accounting is stronger with increases of the rate of outside directors and financial experts in board, which represents independence and professionalism of directors individually.

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