기업의 전략적인 전자공시 시간 선택 행태에 관한 탐색적 연구: 올빼미 공시는 사라졌을까?

초록

We examine the disclosure behavior of companies by analyzing about 1.04 million periodic reports and some major disclosures registered in the DART system from 2001 to 2020. In addition, to verify the effect of the measures of the Financial Services Commission to eradicate the delayed disclosure on May 2, 2019, we also verify the effectiveness of the measures by dividing them into two periods from 2018 to 2020. The main result of the analysis shows that companies are still discriminating the disclosure time according to the type of disclosure. In general, companies prefer the announcement of good news such as a contract for sales or supply and a patent acquisition during the trading time, and announcement of bad news such as capital increase, capital reduction, embezzlement, and breach of trust after the trading time and on Friday. The measures of the Financial Services Commission work effectively but partially. In the case of the registration of the half-term and quarterly reports move to advance the time. However, we have no evidence that the delayed disclosures of the capital increase, the capital reduction, embezzlement, and breach of trust are improved by the measures. This study is significant in that the policy of the Financial Services Commission is verified empirically and the results are presented.

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