감사보수 조정의 비탄력성: 계속감사기간과 감사인 규모의 역할

초록

This study theoretically derives and empirically quantifies audit pricing inelasticity and examines its determinants. Based on incomplete contract theory, which posits that auditors cannot perfectly predict required audit inputs at the contracting stage, we conceptualize audit pricing inelasticity as the extent to which ex post adjustments in actual audit hours relative to contractual hours are not reflected in actual audit fees (the “inelasticity ratio”) and derive the associated economic cost internalized by auditors (the “inelasticity cost”). Using data from Korean listed firms for the 2018-2024 period, we find that the inelasticity ratio increases with auditor tenure but decreases with auditor size. This result suggests that longer auditor-client relationships are associated with more inelastic pricing, whereas Big 4 auditors adjust fees more elastically than non-Big 4 auditors. In contrast, the inelasticity cost decreases with auditor tenure but increases with auditor size, indicating that the economic cost arising from inelastic pricing is driven primarily by actual audit hours in excess of contractual hours, rather than by the degree of inelasticity itself. In additional analyses, we further explore how this inelastic pricing influences staffing decisions and audit quality. We find that engagements with inelastic fee adjustments tend to allocate a larger share of work to junior staff relative to senior staff and partners, and the positive association between extra audit effort and audit quality is attenuated in those engagements. Overall, this study highlights the broader implications of inelastic audit pricing, advancing our knowledge of audit contracting and fee determination structures.

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