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초록
This study empirically analyzed the effect of disclosure level on dividend by using the designation of unfaithful disclosure as a substitute for disclosure level. More specifically, in order to lower the agency cost due to the low disclosure level, the unfaithful disclosure designated company verified whether it changed the dividend policy toward the shareholders favorably. If the dividend payout ratio is high in a company designated as a unfaithful disclosure and the dividend payment amount for the year increases compared to the previous year, it can be interpreted that the dividend policy is used as an alternative means of corporate governance in order to lower the agency cost(substitution hypothesis). On the other hand, if the dividend payout ratio is low it can be interpreted that the manager wants to increase the free cash flow, which reduces the dividend and facilitates opportunistic decision making when the disclosure level is low(outcome hypothesis). In this study, we perform logistic regression and multivariate regression analysis to examine hypotheses using listed companies from 2002 to 2015. Empirical analysis of the change in dividend policy when a company was designated as unfaithful disclosure showed a significant negative (-) relationship between the designation of unfaithful disclosure and the availability of dividends or changes in dividend payments. The results of this empirical analysis support the outcome hypothesis, which implies that dividend policy is also determined against the shareholders. In addition, negative (-) relationship was found between cumulative penalty points and dividend payments or dividend changes. In other words, the lower the level of disclosure, the more serious the agent problem is, the more opportunistic the manager makes the decision, which can be interpreted as affecting the dividend policy. This study have an additional contribution to the relevant preceding study by presenting the results of an analysis that the manager's unfaithful disclosure would affect the company's dividend policy. Moreover, the results of the empirical analysis suggest that low disclosure which may arise due to a manager's moral hazard and opportunistic behavior, may affect the decision of the dividend policy which directly infringes on the shareholders ' wealth.
키워드
- 제목
- 공시수준이 기업 배당정책에 미치는 영향 : 불성실공시 지정기업을 대상으로
- 저자
- 박수연; 문보영; 채수준
- 발행일
- 2018
- 저널명
- 회계정보연구
- 권
- 36
- 호
- 3
- 페이지
- 129 ~ 147