정보기관의 역할과 그룹사고의 중요성: 북베트남에 대한 CIA의 비밀공작(covert action)을 중심으로

초록

This study aims to analyze and evaluate the presumption that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a major role in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War era. The study is designed to analyze the historical process of covert action conducted by the United States against North Vietnam during the Cold War, focusing on what caused their failure. Washington initiated the covert war against Hanoi as the Viet Minh, the precursor to the communist regime, was on the verge of overpowering the French colonialists in 1954. American agents serving in the wartime intelligence organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), had established a closer alliance with the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, during the summer of 1945. However, this alliance was primarily focused on mutual assistance against a shared adversary, the Japanese invaders in Indochina. Accordingly, the study confines its time limit to the period from 1954 to 1972. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) , deactivated in 1972, was a United States special covert operations unit that launched covert unconventional warfare operations prior to and during the Vietnam War. Neighboring countries such as Laos and Cambodia were also to some degree engaged in supporting operations conducted by both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). The two organizations played crucial roles in the covert war against North Vietnam. Hence, the study explores the CIA’s role in U.S. policy on Vietnam and probes the significance of intelligence agencies or other key institutions in international politics.

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