정부보조금의 정치경제적 속성: NGO에 대한 지원의 게임이론적 설명

Political Economy of Government Grants to NGOs: A Game Theory Approach to Government and NGO Moral Hazards

초록

Despites their positive effects on society, NGOs always stand in the middle of hot debates, such as the embezzlement of public money, fraudulent auditing procedures, and over-control by governments. Using a game theory framework, this study investigates relationships between NGOs (money-taker) and governments (the main providers of grants). Specifically, this study addresses the following two issues: 1) How can society (or NGOs) cope with it when government utilizes grants as bait to control NGOs? 2) How does society (or government) manage the moral hazards of NGOs when NGOs are free from auditing? From the analysis of the model, this study suggests self-regulation as a solution to the moral hazards of both government and NGOs. The suggested new system is expected to bring more transparent operation of public grants than the present system of government auditing.

키워드

국고보조금; 비영리민간단체지원법; 보조금의 예산 및 관리에 관한법률; 투명성; NGO; Government grants; Over-control by government; Moral hazards of NGOs; Transparency
제목
정부보조금의 정치경제적 속성: NGO에 대한 지원의 게임이론적 설명
제목 (타언어)
Political Economy of Government Grants to NGOs: A Game Theory Approach to Government and NGO Moral Hazards
저자
양채열; 박치성
발행일
2010-03
저널명
행정논총
권
48
호
1
페이지
121 ~ 141