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초록
This paper aims to focus on the problems of emotion which make great play in Aristotle's ethics, and is emphasized the better in contemporary virtue ethics. The emotion is known as one of the problems sharply conflicting between Kant's deontological ethics and virtue ethics. I will clarify a concept of the virtue of Kant and Aristotle in order to understand better this problem of emotion. The relation of virtue and emotion in Kant ethics is different completely, and each other is separate in moral valuation of our action. Kant says that virtue signifies a moral strength of will, and virtue is the moral strength of a human being's will independent of his emotion in fulfilling his duty. But Aristotle argues that virtues are all dispositions not only to act, but to feel emotion, as reactions as well as impluses to action. I will call emotion in the Aristotelian virtue ethics ‘virtue-emotion’, in contrast to Kant's ‘virtue will’. In this paper I think my work will contribute something to proper understanding of Kant's ethics that has been very severely criticized from contemporary virtue ethics.