경영진 보상에서 재무성과 정보성의 역할: 시장차이를 통한 분석

초록

In an optimal incentive contract, compensation formulas are based on the informa- tiveness principle. Existing literature thus shows that financial performance, invest- ment opportunity set, and peer firms’ performance generally affect executive compensation. This study analyses how the signal-to-noise ratio of financial performance affects the importance(weights) given to these factors in determining executive compensation. The author utilizes the difference between KOSPI and KOSDAQ as a proxy for the difference in the ratios. Using Korean non-banking firms for the period of years 2002 to 2010, the author finds that stock return is positively associated with the levels of ECC in both markets, but does not find a difference between them. However, the change in ROE is found to be positively associated with the level of ECC in KOSPI, but not in KOSDAQ. Secondly, the author finds that the level of ECC is positively associated with the change in ROE for KOSPI firms, but decreasingly with the level of investment opportunity set. Thirdly, peer firms' stock return is negatively associated with the level of ECC, especially for KOSDAQ. This study contributes to the enhanced understanding of executive compensation.

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