Do institutional investors monitor management? Evidence from the relationship between institutional ownership and capital structure

초록

We examine the dynamic relations between institutional ownership and a firm's capital structure. We find that a firm's leverage decreases when institutional ownership increases. This result implies that a firm reduces its debt level as institutional investors substitute for the monitoring role of debt. More importantly, we find that a firm's suboptimal leverage decreases when the institutional ownership increases, and institutional ownership decreases when a firm's suboptimal leverage increases. This finding shows that institutions not only effectively monitor a firm's capital structure but they also passively sell their shares when dissatisfied with it. In addition, we find that the monitoring evidence on a firm's leverage and suboptimal leverage are more pronounced when the institutional investors are less likely to have business relationships with a firm or the information asymmetry is high in the market. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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