대통령제하의 미국 의회주의와 그 한계

Doctrine of Independent Congress and Its Limitations under the Presidentialism in the U.S.

초록

This article aims to conceptualize the U.S. counterpart of European parliamentarism, which is to be called the doctrine of independent Congress(DIC), propose three models for it, provide historical cases fitting each model, and finally explain how the DIC is constrained by political factors coming from the president and Congress on the one hand, and polarization and populism on the other hand. The article argues that the DIC should be explained within the context of the congressional interaction with the president, and proposes the Madisonian, Jeffersonian, and Clayian models for the DIC. Among other things, this article maintains that the Clayian model came to be rarely found beginning with the 20th century, which ushered in the era of modern presidents, and that the Jeffersonian and Madisonian models remain the most relevant models for the DIC. The traditional Madisonian model, however, has been constantly challenged by the Hamiltonian- and Jeffersonian-style presidents, and by the ever deepening political polarization in Congress amid the relentless populism among other things.

키워드

미국의 의회주의; 미국의 대통령제; 매디슨 모델; 제퍼슨 모델; 클레이 모델; Doctrine of Independent Congress in the U.S.; U.S. Presidentialsim; Madison Model; Jefferson Model; Clay Model
제목
대통령제하의 미국 의회주의와 그 한계
제목 (타언어)
Doctrine of Independent Congress and Its Limitations under the Presidentialism in the U.S.
저자
손병권
발행일
2026-08
유형
Y
저널명
의정연구
권
32
호
2
페이지
43 ~ 84