Explaining the Maintenance Process of International Rivalries: A Modified Two-Level Game Approach to the Maintenance of the 2nd Greco-Turkish Rivalry, 1958-2001

초록

The paper begins with a simple question of"why do international rivalries persist over time?" To explain the causes of rivalry persistence, the paper develops " a modified two-level game approach" and tests the hypotheses drawn from the approach for the case of the 2nd Greco-Turkish rivalry, 1958-2001. The approach postulates that the rivalry maintenance is the result of rival leaders' efforts to maximize their interest-i. e., staying in power-subject to external constraint-i. e., great power interventions-and internal constraint-i. e., the challenges from hard-line veto groups. By applying this approach to the 2nd Greco-Turkish rivalry, the paper finds that the leaders of the rivalry maintained their hostile relations partly because the U. S. prevented the leaders from resolving the issues under contention on the battlefields by intervening in the two rivals' military conflict with a threat to stop providing both military and political support and partly because the hard-line veto players within the rivals prevented the leaders from resolving the issues at the negotiation table by hinting of electoral punishment. Under these circumstances, the leaders of the Greco-Turkish rivalry found that maintaining the rivalry would best serve their interest. The findings offer a contribution toward an enhanced understanding of the maintenance process in international rivalries.

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