칸트 윤리학에서 최고선과 도덕적 동기

초록

This paper is a response to another author's second paper entitled “Is A ristotle a Eudaem onist, as Kant criticizes?”(B), w hich in turn was a reply to m y paper “Kant’s M oral H appiness and Aristotle,” which argued against his first paper “Is Aristotelian H appiness a Target for Kant’s Critique”(A), published in the Journal of Kant-Studien of Koreanische Kant-G esellschaft. A sum m ary of article(B) includes his assessm ent in w hich K ant claim s the highest good is the determ ination of pure w ill as A ristoteles does. But it seem s to m e that the Aristotelian one does so because virtue as an elem ent of the highest good constitutes deliberate desire, therefore it can be argued that m oral pleasure is the result in action through phronesis as practical w isdom , not vice versa. In this paper I w ill posit that K ant’s highest good cannot be the determ ining ground of w ill. If it is possible, it can be so only under a restricted condition. T his translates, that happiness is proportional to virtue; nam ely, the second part in the highest good is under m oral law . Thus, respect for the law can be undoubtedly a m oral incentive.

키워드