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The Role of Institutional Investors in the Sustainable CEO Compensation Structure
- Mo, Kyoungwon;
- Park, Kyung Jin;
- Kim, YoungJin
WEB OF SCIENCE
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4초록
Chief executive officer (CEO) retirement pension plans are known as sustainable compensation because they induce managers to make more sustainable and long-term-oriented corporate decisions. We focused on the role of institutional investors in awarding CEO pension plans. Long-term and short-term institutional investors are expected to increase and decrease the CEO pension plan, respectively, wherein the former is aimed at persuading the manager to focus more on the firm's long-term performance and the latter is aimed at making the CEO assume more risk. We empirically tested our hypothesis and found significantly negative (positive) relationship between short-term (long-term) institutional ownership and CEO pension plans, which is consistent with our hypothesis. Our results suggest the institutional ownership horizon's differing impact on managers' sustainable compensation structure.
키워드
- 제목
- The Role of Institutional Investors in the Sustainable CEO Compensation Structure
- 저자
- Mo, Kyoungwon; Park, Kyung Jin; Kim, YoungJin
- 발행일
- 2019-10
- 유형
- Article
- 저널명
- Sustainability
- 권
- 11
- 호
- 19
- 언어
- ENG
- 출판사
- MDPI Open Access Publishing
- 발행국가
- 스위스
- ISSN
- E 2071-1050
P 2071-1050