The Role of Institutional Investors in the Sustainable CEO Compensation Structure

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초록

Chief executive officer (CEO) retirement pension plans are known as sustainable compensation because they induce managers to make more sustainable and long-term-oriented corporate decisions. We focused on the role of institutional investors in awarding CEO pension plans. Long-term and short-term institutional investors are expected to increase and decrease the CEO pension plan, respectively, wherein the former is aimed at persuading the manager to focus more on the firm's long-term performance and the latter is aimed at making the CEO assume more risk. We empirically tested our hypothesis and found significantly negative (positive) relationship between short-term (long-term) institutional ownership and CEO pension plans, which is consistent with our hypothesis. Our results suggest the institutional ownership horizon's differing impact on managers' sustainable compensation structure.

키워드

CEO inside debt; CEO pension plans; institutional ownership; institutional investor; managerial compensation; DEBT HOLDINGS; FINANCIAL RATIOS; PROPENSITY SCORE; OWNERSHIP; INVESTMENT; PREDICTION; AGENCY; COSTS; FIRM
제목
The Role of Institutional Investors in the Sustainable CEO Compensation Structure
저자
Mo, Kyoungwon; Park, Kyung Jin; Kim, YoungJin
DOI
10.3390/su11195485
발행일
2019-10
유형
Article
저널명
Sustainability
권
11
호
19

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