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Institutional investors and cost stickiness: Theory and evidence
- Chung, Chune Young;
- Hur, Seok-Kyun;
- Liu, Chang
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29Citations
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30초록
Cost stickiness measures the degree of suboptimal cost reduction in response to a decline in a firm's activity. This study examines the role of institutional monitoring in addressing the value-decreasing cost-stickiness problem exhibited in many firms. Using alternative proxies for institutional monitoring, we find that long-term institutional investors are associated with reductions in cost stickiness and that these reductions lead to superior future market and accounting performance. Our findings are robust to different model specifications and are independent of the effect of internal governance. © 2018 Elsevier Inc.
키워드
Institutional monitoring; Cost stickiness; F-score; Corporate governance; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; AGENCY COSTS; OWNERSHIP; MARKET; DETERMINANTS; INVESTMENT; EARNINGS; BEHAVIOR; BOARDS
- 제목
- Institutional investors and cost stickiness: Theory and evidence
- 저자
- Chung, Chune Young; Hur, Seok-Kyun; Liu, Chang
- 발행일
- 2019-01
- 유형
- Article in Press
- 권
- 47`
- 페이지
- 336 ~ 350