IPO시장에서 경영자의 기회주의적 행동유인에 대한 외국인주주의 감시역할

초록

Recent studies indicate that managers have a tendency to pursue seek private interest by using the opportunities of IPO. Also, they show that earnings management is associated with managerial ownership as the evidence of managers’ opportunistic behavior in IPO market. Domestic related studies explain that manager's opportunistic behavior may be more strengthened in IPO market of KOSDAQ than in that of KOSPI because of information asymmetry and mitigated requirement. On the other hand, many researches such as Sachs and Warner(1995) and Schleifer &Vishiny(1996) emphasize that foreign ownerships play a positive role in monitoring managerial opportunistic behavior and controling discretional accrual choice by managers. In this study, we aim to investigate whether earnings management by managers is mitigated by surveillance of foreign investors in the IPO market of KOSDAQ, in which strong motives of managerial opportunistic behavior can exist. The empirical results shows that there is inverse relation between foreign ownership and discretionary accrual though high density of managerial ownership induces high level of discretionary accrual in IPO period. It means that foreign ownership can surveil and control managerial opportunistic behavior in IPO market. This paper contributes to the accounting literature by verifying a positive role of foreign ownership in controling managerial opportunistic behavior and discretional accrual choices in IPO market. Also, It implies that stakeholder and information user of IPO company need to consider conflicting attributes of foreign ownership and managerial ownership to increase usefulness of accounting information.

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