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CCA2 Attacks on the Revocable Policy Hiding Bilateral Access Control Scheme With Equality Test for IIoT Environment
- Kim, Jiseung;
- Lee, Hyung Tae
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0초록
Hassan et al. recently proposed RBAC-ET, a revocable policy hiding bilateral access control scheme with equalitytest for cloud-enabled Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), andclaimed IND-CCA2 and OW-CCA2 security (IEEE Internet ofThings Journal, 2026). This letter revisits the chosen ciphertextsecurity of Hassan et al.’s RBAC-ET and shows that these claimsdo not hold. The main weakness is that decryption does notauthenticate the entire ciphertext. As a result, an adversary cantransform a challenge ciphertext into a different ciphertext thatis still accepted by the decryption oracle and obtain the challengeplaintext from the resulting decryption query. We present twosimple attacks: one exploits the malleability of the equalitytest components, and the other exploits the additive structureof the message component. Both attacks require only a singledecryption query and break both IND-CCA2 and OW-CCA2security. We also discuss a lightweight countermeasure that addsa ciphertext validity check to prevent the identified adaptivechosen ciphertext (CCA2) attacks.
키워드
- 제목
- CCA2 Attacks on the Revocable Policy Hiding Bilateral Access Control Scheme With Equality Test for IIoT Environment
- 저자
- Kim, Jiseung; Lee, Hyung Tae
- 발행일
- 2026-11
- 유형
- Article
- 권
- 13
- 호
- 21
- 페이지
- 51523 ~ 51526
- 언어
- ENG
- 출판사
- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
- 발행국가
- 미국
- 분량
- 4 페이지
- ISSN
- E 2327-4662
P 2372-2541