CCA2 Attacks on the Revocable Policy Hiding Bilateral Access Control Scheme With Equality Test for IIoT Environment

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초록

Hassan et al. recently proposed RBAC-ET, a revocable policy hiding bilateral access control scheme with equalitytest for cloud-enabled Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), andclaimed IND-CCA2 and OW-CCA2 security (IEEE Internet ofThings Journal, 2026). This letter revisits the chosen ciphertextsecurity of Hassan et al.’s RBAC-ET and shows that these claimsdo not hold. The main weakness is that decryption does notauthenticate the entire ciphertext. As a result, an adversary cantransform a challenge ciphertext into a different ciphertext thatis still accepted by the decryption oracle and obtain the challengeplaintext from the resulting decryption query. We present twosimple attacks: one exploits the malleability of the equalitytest components, and the other exploits the additive structureof the message component. Both attacks require only a singledecryption query and break both IND-CCA2 and OW-CCA2security. We also discuss a lightweight countermeasure that addsa ciphertext validity check to prevent the identified adaptivechosen ciphertext (CCA2) attacks.

키워드

adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack; Bilateral access control; ciphertext validity; equality test
제목
CCA2 Attacks on the Revocable Policy Hiding Bilateral Access Control Scheme With Equality Test for IIoT Environment
저자
Kim, Jiseung; Lee, Hyung Tae
DOI
10.1109/JIOT.2026.3727458
발행일
2026-11
유형
Article
저널명
IEEE Internet of Things Journal
권
13
호
21
페이지
51523 ~ 51526