칸트와 흄 - 도덕적 이성과 공감

초록

In this paper I tried to show the third way to argue for the thesis that moral judgment contains a objective and universal general one or a general point of view. I would contend insist that Hume failed to show a possible general standpoint of moral judgment by sympathy and humanity through the correcting of sympathy, and Kant couldn’t know that emotions like compassion or benevolence have deeply close relation to reason, likewise. The reason why Hume and Kant failed is that they believed that an general and valid moral judgment is possible through the correction sympathy by reflective imagination or purely formal rational law independently of emotion at all costs. But these conditions is not sufficient to justify possibility of such a moral judgment because Hume’s concept of emotions is insufficient to sustain a general point of view of moral judgment, and Kant’s reason cannot explain properly why we observe or follow moral duty. Therefore I insist that an objective and general moral judgment is based on moral will or rational emotion similar to Kant's practical reason which contains internal connections between reason and emotion in order to dissolve these problems.

키워드