기업의 직원 복지제도가 경영자의 이익조정을 감소시키는가?：복리후생비 및 주식보상비를 중심으로

초록

[Purpose]This study aims to examine whether two representative employee welfare schemes—employee benefits expenditures and stock—based compensation—serve to reduce managerial earnings management. [Methodology]Using a sample of firms listed on the Korea Exchange over the period from 2020 to 2024, this study investigates the effect of employee benefits expenditures and stock—based compensation on managerial earnings management. Discretionary accruals based on Dechow et al. (1995) and performance—matched discretionary accruals following Kothari et al. (2005) are employed as proxies for earnings management. [Findings]The empirical results show that both employee benefits expenditures and stock—based compensation are significantly negatively associated with discretionary accruals. In particular, stock—based compensation exhibits a statistically significantly stronger effect in constraining managerial earnings management than employee benefits expenditures. [Implications]These findings suggest that employee benefits expenditures and stock—based compensation should be designed and managed not merely as targets for cost reduction, but as governance mechanisms that help curb earnings management and enhance financial reporting transparency. In addition, regulators and auditors should not focus solely on the level of discretionary accruals, but should also consider the structure of employee benefits and stock—based compensation in order to assess earnings management risk in a more comprehensive manner.

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