국내 증권산업의 구조재편에 관한 분석과 정책적 시사점

초록

The enactment of the Capital Market and Financial Investment Service Act in February 2009 created an environment for Korean securities industry to be reconstructed by M&As. Meanwhile, due to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the business strategy for the Korean securities companies to engage further in investment banking have been threatened. Taking such arguments into account, this paper investigates the reasons why M&As of Korean securities companies have been so rare from the perspective of individual company’s incentives based on the parsimonious theoretical model. The paper’s main theoretical results are as follows. First, the size of securities companies achieved by the M&As have a reciprocal relationship with both the brokerage fees and the adjustment costs occurred in consolidation. Second, if there is no government intervention in the process of restructuring, the number of companies that are willing to participate in the M&As is smaller than that of the socially desirable number. Third, if the market demand for the investment banking business is small, then so is the individual incentives to participate in M&As. Also, it provides empirical evidence supporting the theoretical implications by comparing the characteristics of securities industries between Korea and the US. The comparison analysis suggests that the size of investment banking business in Korea is almost half of that in the US and the market concentration ratio, e.g. CR5 of securities industry is far lower in Korea, implying highly competitive business environment. Therefore, in order to prevent small-scaled investment banks in Korea in the future, it is recommended that the government should provide various incentives for the securities companies to build up sufficient capital above a certain threshold.

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