인건비 변화행태와 경영자의 통제수단; 흑자, 적자기업의 비교

초록

This paper investigates labor cost behavior of which rigorous studies have been relatively lacking in the literature. In this study, we analyze if changes in firms’ labor cost behavior are different when firms are in the black(profit firms) from when those are in the red(loss firms) using the data of Korean manufacturing firms from year 2000 to year 2009. Our study examines the effects (labor cost elasticity with respect to firms’ sales) on the number of employee and labor costs per capita separately. By doing so, we can see how means of labor cost may change depending on the status of firms’ profits when managers reduce labor costs. It is found that when firms’ sales rise, an increase in labor costs is smaller for firms in the red(loss firms) than those in the black(profit firms) while a decrease in labor costs is greater for firms in the red(loss firms) than those in the black(profit firms) when firms’ sales decline. It turns out that firms in the black(profit firms) have the sticky labor cost behavior whereas firms in the red(loss firms) have the flexible labor cost behavior. It indicates that firms’ labor cost behavior is different when they are in the red(loss firms) or black(profit firms). We also find that when firms’ sales rise, firms in the black(profit firms) increase the number of employee more than firms in the red(loss firms) whereas firms in the red(loss firms) decrease the number of employee more than firms in the black(profit firms) when firms’ sales decline. It is shown that firms in the black(profit firms) have the sticky cost behavior in terms of the number of employee while firms in the red(loss firms) have flexible cost behavior in terms of the number of employee. However, the effects on labor costs per capita are symmetric for both groups of firms. It implies that labor cost behavior depends on the status of firms’ profits: when firms’ sales decline, firms in the black(profit firms) prefer reduction on labor costs per capita to reduction on the number of employee while firms in the red(loss firms) prefer reduction on the number of employee to reduction on labor costs per capita. We further find that cost behavior is different for firms that turn into black(profit firms) from red(loss firms) from those with continuous positive profits. The contributions of this study are as follows: First, unlike previous studies, the current paper analyzes total labor cost behavior including both production and non-production (management) labor costs of Korean manufacturing firms. Second, our analysis differentiates labor cost behavior of firms in the black(profit firms) from firms in the red(loss firms) so that it finds differences in means of labor cost behavior of two groups. Some of existing studies have investigated differences in firms’ cost behavior considering particular profit status (e.g. large profits, turning to profits from deficit, a large deficit) but a study on fundamental differences on cost behavior between firms are in the black(profit firms) and those in the red(loss firms) has not been conducted. Next, this study distinguishes control means of labor costs using two different variables, the number of employee and labor costs per capita. This distinction enables us to examine managers’ strategic behavior on control means of labor costs. We expect that findings and methodology in this paper contribute for better understanding on the studies on firms’ asymmetric cost behavior and labor cost management.

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