주주이자 채권자인 투자자의 존재는 현금의 한계가치를 감소시키는가?: 재무위험과 R&D 투자를 중심으로

초록

Debt holders and equity holders exhibit different risk preferences, because debt holders are fixed claimants receiving interest and principal payments in return for their investments while equity holders are residual claimants. Prior studies point out that debt holders face an agency problem from managers making decisions to maximize equity holders' wealth at the expense of debt holders’ interest, also known as the asset substitution problem. Recently, however, a distinct group of investors acquire debt and equity simultaneously (hereafter DE investors), requiring further investigation into the role of DE investors in the capital market. This study attempts to examine how the presence of DE investors affects the market valuation of cash holdings. Empirical analysis based on a sample of public firms during 2001-2014 reveals the following. First, the presence of DE investors has little impact on the marginal value of cash at typical firms, but reduces the marginal value of cash at firms with low leverage. This is consistent with the prediction that DE investors prevent managers from spending cash on risky investments that help maximize equity value. Equity holders thus discount the value of cash holdings in the presence of DE investors. Second, the negative effect on the marginal value of cash is more pronounced at firms that rely more heavily on R&D investments. This indicates that DE investors play a particularly critical role in protecting debt holders’ wealth and mitigating the asset substitution problem at firms that are more likely to invest in risky projects, and that their presence leads the equity holders to discount the value of cash. These results deepen our understanding of DE investors as a group balancing the interests of debt holders and equity holders in the capital market.

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