소유 경영자가 내재 자기자본비용에 미치는 영향: 재벌기업을 중심으로

Owner-Managers and the Implied Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from Chaebol Firms
  • 박수연
  • 전홍민

초록

This paper examines whether and how different CEO types affect the implied cost of equity capital in Korean chaebol firms. Using 946 firm-year observations of KOSPI-listed firms for the period 2005-2015, a significant positive correlation was observed between chaebol firms with owner-managers and the implied cost of equity capital. This implies that investors regard the agency problems of Korean chaebol firms that have owner-managers as a risk premium factor that requires a higher cost of capital. Moreover, the positive association between chaebol firms that have owner-managers and the implied cost of equity capital was more pronounced in firms with a low proportion of outside directors and high uncertainty period. This paper has potential implications for related literature in that owner-managers, internal governance, and education level may significantly influence the cost of equity capital in Korean chaebol firms.

키워드

owner-managersagency problemproportion of outside directorsuncertainty periodimplied cost of equity capital
제목
소유 경영자가 내재 자기자본비용에 미치는 영향: 재벌기업을 중심으로
제목 (타언어)
Owner-Managers and the Implied Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from Chaebol Firms
저자
박수연전홍민
DOI
10.17287/kmr.2021.50.5.1255
발행일
2021-10
저널명
경영학연구
50
5
페이지
1255 ~ 1277