가족기업의 지배력과 경영참여에 따른 회계보수성 차이

초록

According to previous studies (Wang, 2006; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008), family firms have a motivation for management to continue to increase the dividends of business outcomes in a sustainable manner, from a long-term point of view. Since the Accounting conservatism of a company contribute to improvements in productivity and to sustainable growth over the long term, family firms show a higher level of Accounting conservatism when compared to non-family firms. Meanwhile, since the corporate governance structure has a varying influence on the decision making of management, depending on the governing power and management participation, the extent of Accounting conservatism can differ between different types of family firms, including the family-governing power and management firm, the family-governing power firm, and the family-management firm, and can also differ from that of non-family firms. This study adopted the listed as KSE firms from January, 2001 to December, 2010 were selected. Financial statements were obtained for the companies of interest listed on the stock exchange during the same time period. First of all, an ANOVA F-test was conducted on the Accounting conservatism of family-governing power and management firms, family-governing firms, family-management firms, and non-family firms. The study results show that there was a difference at a significance level of 1% in these four groups. To put it concretely, the management performance of family firms is summarized as follows: a family-governing power and management firm is defined as a firm in which family members participate in management and hold the governing power of the firm. Family CEO is a shareholder in this firm, in which the agency effect that exists between CEO and the agency does not occur. A family-governing power firm represents a firm which holds the governing power without the participation of family members in management. Therefore, the agency effect between the family shareholder and management specialist(CEO) is likely to occur. A family-management firm is defined as a firm in which family members participate in management, but they do not hold the governing power of the firm. Accordingly, another agency effect can be seen between family management and shareholders. The results of the regression analysis show that C_ACC is family management firm and family-governing power firm have a significant difference of 5% in Accounting conservatism, while C_score is family management firm and family-governing power firm showed a significant difference of 1%. The major contribution of this study is to build upon the results of previous studies that showed that family firms have uniformly higher levels of Accounting conservatism than non-family firms and to further develop the relevant research by demonstrating that all types of family businesses do not have the same level of Accounting conservatism and that their Accounting conservatism levels may vary depending on the family’s participation in terms of the governing power and management of the firm.

키워드

가족기업; 지배력; 회계보수성; 대리인효과; Family firm; governing power; management participation; Accounting conservatism
제목
가족기업의 지배력과 경영참여에 따른 회계보수성 차이
저자
정도진; 박지현
발행일
2014
저널명
회계정보연구
권
32
호
4
페이지
509 ~ 529