관료의 전략적 행동과 제도의 연속성: 한국 금융감독제도개편의 정치과정, 1997~2008년

Bureaucrat’s Strategic Behavior and Institutional Continuity: The Politics of Financial Regulatory Reform in Korea, 1997-2008

초록

This study aims to explain how and why, despite rampant pressure for fundamental reform, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) could successfully defend its core interests in the three major changes in financial supervisory system. Since 1997, the Korean government repeatedly embarked on financial supervisory reform not just to dismantle the institutional legacies of the authoritarian regime, but to enhance financial liberalization as a means to strengthen international competitiveness of Korean firms. However, a series of reforms could not achieve its desired goal. Specifically, in the 1997 reform, the separation of financial policy from supervisory policy was not firmly established. In the 1999 reform, the MOFE could increase its influence by expanding the secretariat of the Financial Supervision Commission (FSC). In the 2008 reform as well, the MOFE succeeded in securing an institutional route to influence supervisory policy by creating a separate body in charge of the financial sector. This study applies three key variables - the time horizon of major players, the scope of major players’ interest, and policy authority under existing institutions - to explain the MOFE’s strategic behavior in the reform process.

키워드

financial supervisory system; financial reform; bureaucrat; MOFE; strategic behavior; 금융감독제도; 금융개혁; 관료; 재경부; 전략적 행동
제목
관료의 전략적 행동과 제도의 연속성: 한국 금융감독제도개편의 정치과정, 1997~2008년
제목 (타언어)
Bureaucrat’s Strategic Behavior and Institutional Continuity: The Politics of Financial Regulatory Reform in Korea, 1997-2008
저자
이승주; 이민정
발행일
2012
저널명
국제정치논총
권
52
호
4
페이지
145 ~ 169